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SUMMARYEurope is not delivering on its Lisbon agenda commitment to
increase its R&D-to-GDP ratio to three percent by 2010. This is worrying,
not only because Europe seems unable to reach an objective it has publicly
set itself, but mainly because in 2006 its R&D intensity was still below two
percent, having flatlined for more than two decades. As far as business-
funded R&D is concerned, the Chinese business sector has even
outperformed European firms. The Lisbon-inspired national R&D targets are
equally overambitious. The European Commission’s benchmarking of mem-
ber states against the headline three percent figure is questionable
because such comparisons rarely take into account the effect of industrial
specialisation. For most countries, R&D intensity is a by-product of special-
isation. However, Swedish and US R&D intensity is higher than their
industrial structure would suggest, implying that other factors are at work,
such as a large integrated technology market and a superior academic
research environment.
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At EU level, the aggregate government
sector should first correct its own
failure and support research activities
up to a threshold of one percent of GDP.
Setting targets for private R&D is inef-
fective. The drivers of private R&D call
for a more integrated European market
for technology, notably an EU patent in
lieu of the current system, which
involves prohibitive costs. Also, more
funding is needed for academic
research, as a magnet for local and for-
eign business R&D activity in Europe.
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Source: OECD MSTI, 2007. Industry-financed GERD as a %
of GDP; * indicates the year 2005 instead of 2006.b
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EUROPE’S R&D: MISSING THE WRONG TARGETS?
ONE OF THE MAIN GOALSof the EU’s
Lisbon agenda is to achieve a high-
er level of research and
development (R&D) spending. Two
sub-targets for R&D spending were
clearly defined in 2002: EU R&D
intensity (R&D expenditure divid-
ed by GDP) was to increase from
about 1.8 percent in the late
1990s to about three percent by
2010; and two-thirds of this
spending was to be funded by the
business sector, the rest being
funded by governments.
As illustrated in Figure 1, R&D
intensity in the EU has been stable
since the early 1980s, fluctuating
between 1.6 percent and 1.8
percent. In 2006, R&D intensity in
the EU was still under 1.8 percent.
The relative spend on research
activities in the US has also been
stable, but on average above 2.5
percent. Japan exhibits an impres-
sive performance, with a constant-
ly increasing R&D intensity that
has remained well above three
percent since the early 2000s.
Figure 1 also illustrates the dra-
matic increase in China’s total
R&D expenditure relative to GDP,
from about 0.5 percent 10 years
ago to 1.5 percent in 2006. Bottom
line: the EU is not really catching
up with the US or Japan in terms of
research spend, while China is
catching up with the EU.
The objective of this Policy Brief is
to provide a critical assessment of
the R&D component of the Lisbon
agenda. Section one underlines
the considerable gap between the
current levels of R&D intensity and
the national objectives that were
announced as part of the relaunch
of the Lisbon agenda. This section
also illustrates governments’
sluggish, and in certain cases
counter-intuitive, behaviour with
regard to their own self-set agen-
da. In section two we explain why
common R&D targets make little
economic sense in an EU where
industrial specialisa-
tion differs substan-
tially across countries.
Failing to account for
national industrial
structures may
actually lead to
skewed country
benchmarks. Section
three investigates what can be
done to improve the expected
return to R&D in Europe, and
hence the propensity to invest in
R&D. It sets out two broad policy
recommendations which  would
improve Europe’s R&D prospects.
1. DELIVERY FAILURE
The intensity of R&D spending
across EU member states varies
considerably. Figure 2 shows that
some countries have reached
relatively high levels, especially
Finland and Sweden, which several
years ago leapfrogged the three
percent threshold. Sweden’s per-
formance lies close to four
percent. Denmark, Austria and
Germany are around the 2.5
percent threshold, whereas France
is just above two
percent. However, the
vast majority of
countries has an R&D
intensity of well below
two  percent, fluctuat-
ing between 0.5
percent and two
percent of GDP, with a
median of 1.2 percent. This broad
range of intensities is also
observed within the US, but with a
median R&D intensity that is
much higher than in Europe, as
illustrated in Table 1. The best
European performer, Sweden, has
an R&D intensity which is less
than half that of the top US per-
former, New Mexico
1. Seven US
states have an R&D intensity high-
er than four percent, against none
for the EU.
Trends in the R&D-to-GDP ratio pro-
vide an interesting insight into
how active countries have been in
1New Mexico is a
relatively small state,
which has a remarkably
high level of R&D
intensity. This is largely
attributable to federal
support to federally
funded R&D centres
(FFRDCs) provided by
the US Department of
Energy.
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Figure 1: R&D intensity of selected EU and non-EU countries, 2006
Source: OECD, MSTI, 2007. The figures are gross expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP. The
2006 figures for the EU have been extrapolated from Eurostat figures. OECD sources are used
because they provide comparable figures for China, Japan and the US.
‘Europe’s R&D effort
has been flatlining
for two decades.’EUROPE’S R&D: MISSING THE WRONG TARGETS?
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seeking to improve their relative
performance. From 1996 to 2006
the median R&D intensity in
Europe increased only slightly. In
absolute terms, the most dynamic
countries have been Finland (+1.2
percent), Austria (+0.9 percent),
Denmark (+0.6 percent) and
Sweden (+0.5 percent). These four
countries already had a very high
level of R&D intensity in 1995, and
have made the most marked
improvement over the subsequent
decade. It is worth mentioning that
three countries have seen a drop
in their levels of R&D intensity:
France (-0.1 percent), the United
Kingdom (-0.2 percent), and the
Netherlands (-0.2 percent). Their
levels of R&D expenditure play an
important  part in aggregate EU
R&D intensity. As illustrated in
Table 2 (overleaf), this drop may
be explained in part by a drop in
government-funded R&D observed
in the three countries, which has
not been offset by an increase in
business R&D expenditure. Table 2
presents government-financed
and industry-financed R&D as a
percentage of GDP, in 1995 and
2006. Three main observations
can be made about these figures:
• First, none of the EU member
states has fulfilled its self-set
commitment, as no country
actually devotes one percent of
its GDP to funding public (high-
er education, laboratories) or
business-channelled (subsi-
dies and procurement)
research activities. The only
countries that are close to the
one percent target are Sweden,
Austria and Finland.
• Second, despite the Lisbon
agenda, a large number of
countries have actually
Table 1
Structure of R&D intensity across the EU and US states, most recent data
EU27, 2006 US, 2004
Maximum Sweden 3.8% New Mexico 8.0%
Minimum
Cyprus (0.42%)
Romania (0.46%)
Wyoming (0.40%)
South Dakota (0.50%)
Median across states 1.2% 1.9%
Average across states 1.4% 2.2%
90th percentile 2.5% 4.3%
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, US National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources
Statistics, National Patterns of R&D Resources (annual series), Science and Engineering Indicators
2007. The full state-level data is presented in Figure 2.
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Fig 2. R&D intensity of US federated states (2004), and EU member states (2006)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources
Statistics, National Patterns of R&D Resources(annual series), Science and Engineering Indicators 2007b
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EUROPE’S R&D: MISSING THE WRONG TARGETS?
reduced their government fund-
ing of R&D as a percentage of
GDP. The aggregate EU27
government-funded R&D
intensity fell between the mid
1990s and 2005. Interestingly,
a drop also occurred in the US
and Japan over the same
period, but it was largely com-
pensated for by a more than
proportional increase in busi-
ness-funded R&D, which was
not the case for EU27.
• Third, the Chinese business-
funded R&D intensity is at the
same level, in fact a little higher,
than that of Europe, bearing
witness to the dramatic
increase in private R&D activity
in China.
In addition to this counter-intuitive
behaviour whereby the ‘average’
EU government has actually
reduced its support to R&D activity
over the past ten years, the spend-
ing targets which individual
countries have chosen to set
themselves were overly ambitious.
Indeed, Figure 3 illustrates a clear
positive relationship between a
country’s distance from the three
percent target in 2004 and the tar-
get it has set itself for 2010. The
further away from the Lisbon tar-
get a country was, the bigger the
increase projected in the national
programme implementing the
Lisbon agenda. Although this could
be seen as expressing political will
to catch up with the best perform-
ers, many of the targets set are
clearly unrealistic. They appear to
represent wishful thinking rather
than political momentum. The
right-hand side of Figure 3 shows
that some countries have set
2010 targets that are between two
and four times higher than their
level of R&D intensity in 2004.
2. SKEWED COUNTRY
BENCHMARKING
In addition to the relative
government spend on research
activities, a second issue that
must be examined when
evaluating countries’ R&D per-
formance is industrial specialisa-
tion.  A country specialised in
finance (eg Luxembourg) would
not need a high level of R&D
expenditure in order to ensure
growth – at least as commonly
measured (the innovative efforts
that are required to introduce new
financial products are not included
in R&D statistics). Similarly, a
country specialised in tourism,
fashion, services or food would
logically have lower R&D intensity
than a country specialised in the
pharmaceuticals, engineering or
biotech industries. Interpretations
drawn from Figure 2 and Figure 3
are therefore to be treated with a
substantial degree of caution. For
instance, Finland has a reputation
for specialisation in information
and communication technologies,
an industry which is very intensive
in R&D. Taking into account this
specialisation, the Finnish R&D
Table 2
Industry and government-financed gross expenditure on R&D (GERD), as
a percentage of GDP (1995 and 2006, or closest date)
Industry-funded GERD Government-funded GERD
2006 1995 Difference 2006 1995 Difference
Sweden 2.55 2.17 0.38 0.91 0.96 -0.05
Finland 2.30 1.35 0.95 0.87 0.79 0.08
Germany 1.68 1.31 0.37 0.70 0.83 -0.13
Denmark 1.46 0.82 0.64 0.67 0.72 -0.05
Luxembourg 1.28 na na 0.27 na na
Austria 1.14 0.70 0.44 0.90 0.72 0.18
France 1.12 1.10 0.02 0.82 0.96 -0.14
Belgium 1.11 1.12 -0.01 0.46 0.39 0.07
Netherlands 0.90 0.90 0.00 0.64 0.83 -0.19
Czech Republic 0.88 0.60 0.28 0.60 0.31 0.29
Slovenia 0.82 0.72 0.10 0.56 0.64 -0.08
Ireland 0.79 0.85 -0.06 0.40 0.28 0.12
United Kingdom 0.75 0.94 -0.19 0.58 0.64 -0.06
Spain 0.52 0.35 0.17 0.48 0.35 0.13
Italy 0.43 0.41 0.02 0.56 0.52 0.04
Hungary 0.43 0.27 0.16 0.45 0.38 0.07
Portugal 0.29 0.11 0.18 0.45 0.35 0.10
Poland 0.18 0.23 -0.05 0.32 0.38 -0.06
Slovak Republic 0.17 0.55 -0.38 0.27 0.35 -0.08
Greece 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.04
Romania 0.14 0.31 -0.17 0.29 0.46 -0.17
Median 0.82 0.70 0.10 0.56 0.46 0.00
EU27 0.94 0.86 0.08 0.61 0.66 -0.05
United States 1.70 1.51 0.19 0.77 0.89 -0.12
Japan 2.53 1.96 0.57 0.56 0.67 -0.11
China 0.99 na na 0.35 na na
Source: OECD, MSTI, 2007.EUROPE’S R&D: MISSING THE WRONG TARGETS?
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intensity may be perceived as not
being particularly high.
The role of specialisation has
received increased attention in
recent European reports on
innovation (see the Aho Group
report (2006), the second report
of the Knowledge for Growth Group
(2007) and the Commission’s Key
Figures 2007). This is important,
as some countries generally
praised for their above-average
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission, National Reform Programmes and annual reports
on implementation. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Sweden not included as we were not
able to find an explicit R&D target in the National Reform Programmes of those countries.
In order to evaluate the extent to
which industrial specialisation
may affect our assessment of
national R&D performance we rely
on the estimates provided by
Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe
(2008), which seek to shed light
on the drivers of business-funded
R&D at the industry level. They use
panel data of industry-specific
R&D spending for about 20
industrial sectors in 10 countries
over the period 1991-2002. Their
results lead to three observations:
• Technological specialisation
explains the variation in R&D
intensity much better than any
other country specificities.
• Not taking into account
industrial specialisation may
lead to a highly skewed ranking
of countries.
• When industrial specialisation
is taken into account, only
Sweden and the US still outper-
form other countries. Neither
Japan nor Finland has a partic-
ularly high R&D intensity in
relation to what their industrial
structures would suggest.
In a nutshell, business R&D
intensity is endogenous, not
exogenous. Governments should
therefore go beyond traditional
incentive policies such as direct
R&D subsidies or tax credits. To set
a business-funded R&D target at
the country level is thus either
wishful thinking or an implicit
industrial policy – a way to alter
the country’s industrial structure.
In other words, there is no basis for
the setting of EU-wide or country
targets in the Lisbon programmes
unless the EU’s intention is to
determine member states’
industrial structure. Pouring R&D
money into low-tech sectors would
R&D intensity may actually not be
performing particularly well given
their specialisation in R&D-inten-
sive industries. Figure 4 shows the
R&D intensity of most
manufacturing industries aver-
aged over ten OECD countries. It is
clear that there are very consider-
able differences between sectors.
This confirms that international
comparisons of R&D intensities
should take account of the particu-
lar specialisation of each country.
AT
BE
CY
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
GR
HU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
NL
PL
PT
SK
SL
ES
UK
0
1
2
3
4
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Gap between the 3 percent target and the level of R&D intensity in 2004
Ratio of the national 
target (2010) to the
national R&D
intensity (2004)
Figure 3: R&D intensity targets for 2010 compared ‘the Lisbon gap’ in 2004
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Source: Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe based on OECD, ANBERD and STAN databases (2005).
Figure 4: R&D intensity by industry, average across ten countriesEUROPE’S R&D: MISSING THE WRONG TARGETS?
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clearly have only a very small
impact on aggregate efficiency.
The strong increase observed in
the R&D intensity of Finland,
Denmark and Sweden is attributa-
ble in large measure to the trend in
their technological specialisation
towards R&D intensive industries,
as illustrated in European
Commission’s Key Figures 2007.
At EU level, technological speciali-
sation has not evolved much
towards R&D intensive industries,
which explains the lack of ‘visible
progress’ over the past few years
2.
This technological specialisation
factor is taken by the Commission
to explain both the European R&D
‘inertia’ (the business R&D
intensity has been very stable over
the past twenty years) and the EU
gap with respect to the business
R&D intensity of the US
3.
However, the results obtained by
Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe
(2008) suggest that when the
technological specialisation of
countries is taken
into account,
S w e d e n  a n d ,  t o  a
lesser extent, the US
still display above-
average R&D
intensity. Something
other than techno-
logical specialisa-
tion thus seems to drive R&D
intensity in Sweden and the US.
The next section puts forward ten-
tative explanations for the US and
Swedish exceptions and draws
lessons for EU and national policy.
3. HOW CAN EUROPE STIMULATE
BUSINESS R&D?
One important driver of business
R&D expenditure is the expected
return on the investment. What
would improve this expected
return? Beside fashionable R&D
tax credit or direct subsidisation
policies designed to reduce the
cost of carrying out R&D, two spe-
cific policy areas deserve particu-
lar attention in Europe
4:
An integrated market for
innovation
Larger markets would logically
result in a higher expected return
on investment in R&D. The market
size hypothesis may explain why
the US has an above-average R&D
intensity (larger than its industrial
structure would suggest).  The US
benefits from a huge and homoge-
neous market, with one main lan-
guage and one regulation
5. In
Europe, sending a product from
Amsterdam for sale in Brussels is
still considered an ‘export’, where-
as in the US a product made in New
York and sold in Los Angeles is
labelled ‘distribution’. Besides
these proverbial examples, a large
body of evidence
has been published
on the lack of
European integra-
tion. And an addi-
tional key growth
ingredient is still
missing: an EU-wide
financing solution
for emerging companies
6.
Emblematic of the lack of market
integration is the way the
innovation system works in
Europe. The European patent
system, and hence the European
market for technology, is highly
fragmented. Once a patent has
been granted by the European
Patent Office (EPO), it must be
validated, translated, monitored
and enforced in all relevant nation-
al patent offices. For that reason, a
patent examined by the EPO and
then enforced in 13 European
countries costs about 11 times
more than a patent granted by the
United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), and 14
times more than a patent granted
by the Japanese Patent office
(JPO)
7. The gap is still consider-
able for 20-year protection. In
2004, a European patent exam-
ined by the EPO and validated in
13 member states cost more than
€20,000, against €1,800 in the US
and €1,500 in Japan.
These costs only include the filing
examination, validation, transla-
tion and renewal fees. They do not
reflect the managerial complexity
of enforcing patent portfolios in
several European countries, nor do
they include the litigation costs in
case of infringement. The policy
implication is straightforward. The
‘The ‘average’ EU
government has
actually reduced its
support to R&D activity
over the past ten years.’
Table 3
European patent costs (enforced
in 13 countries) relative to the US
and Japan
Cumulated
fees and
translation
costs (*)
Total cost
for 20
years (**)
US 11 9
Japan 14 7
Source: Adapted from van Pottelsberghe and
François (2006). These figures represent the
simulated costs of a European patent divided
by the simulated cost of an average patent in
the US and in Japan. (*) The costs include the
expenses (fees and translation costs) for a
patent examined by the European Patent
Office (EPO) and validated in 13 European
countries after granting. (**) The total cost
for 20 years also includes the renewal fees
for 20 years in 13 European countries. These
costs are related to the absolute cost of an
average patent. The recently ratified London
Protocol will reduce translation costs
somewhat.
2“The lack of visible
progress between 2002
and 2005 is largely due
to the fact that busi-
ness research expendi-
tures depend on the
structure of industry,
which evolves slowly”,
European
Commissioner
Potocnik, December
2007, ‘Towards an open
and competitive
European Research
Area’, in ‘The future of
Science and Technology
in Europe’, MCTES.
3“..The EU/US BERD
deficit cannot be attrib-
uted to the fact that
individual European
companies perform
less R&D than their US
counterparts in the
same sector: the main
reason for the deficit is
linked to differences
between the European
and American industrial
structures.” (Key
Figures 2007, p. 35)
4In addition to the
numerous innovation-
related policy recom-
mendations proposed
by expert groups, such
as the Aho Group report
(2006) and the second
report of the Knowledge
for Growth Group
(2007) mentioned in
section 2 of this Policy
Brief.EUROPE’S R&D: MISSING THE WRONG TARGETS?
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failure to create an EU patent
places a heavy burden on the
shoulders of European innovators
and entrepreneurs at the very
beginning of the innovation
process - a clear comparative dis-
advantage for Europe with respect
to the US and Japan. 
More and better academic
research
Market size may explain US per-
formance with regard to R&D
intensity, but it does not explain
the performance of Sweden. The
explanation here is probably linked
to the relatively very high level of
spending on academic research,
the highest (as a percentage of
GDP) in the whole OECD area, as
illustrated by Figure 5. This strong
emphasis on academic research is
also a stimulus for business R&D:
universities generate new ideas
which are then transferred to the
private sector. The transformation
of these ideas into products or
processes requires further applied
research activity and
development. Not surprisingly, the
four countries in Figure 5 with the
highest academic R&D intensities
are also the four countries with the
highest business R&D intensities.
Provided effective technology
transfer systems are
put in place, academic
research is probably
the most effective
source of new ideas,
which in turn induce
further research in the
business sector
8. In
this respect, the European
Research Council (ERC), which
provides merit-based fundamental
research grants, is a recent
positive example of what the EU
can achieve. 
Not only does academic research
feed ideas to the market, but it
also attracts more funding from
the business sector and promotes
the setting up of scientific clus-
ters. For instance,
Abramovsky  et al
(2007) show that,
in the UK,
universities with a
high scientific out-
put attract signifi-
cantly more local
and foreign research
laboratories to their neighbour-
hood. This question is key because
gaining a technological edge is the
main driving force
behind foreign busi-
ness R&D investment,
be it in the US, in
Europe, or elsewhere.
In fact, large firms
nowadays increasing-
ly invest in emerging
markets, which provide a high-
quality labour force at much lower
cost than in Europe
9. As shown by
Thursby and Thursby (2006) in
their survey of US and European
firms, a majority of respondents
expect to increase their technical
staff in China and India, while they
anticipate a substantial decrease
in such staff in Europe.
The important role
played by academic
research as provider
of ideas to the busi-
ness sector and as
a driver of foreign
R&D expenditure
implies a need for
relatively more
resources to be devoted to higher
education research activities.
Indeed the recent Bruegel Policy
Brief on European universities
underlines that Europe invests too
little in higher education and that
‘European universities suffer from
poor governance, insufficient
autonomy and often perverse
incentives’
10. In addition to reme-
dying these three failings, govern-
ments should also provide more
funding for universities’ research
activities. The alternative for
Europe will be to lose related busi-
ness research, and ultimately to
lose business.
‘The European
patent system, and
hence the market
for technology, is
highly fragmented.’
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Figure 5: Business-funded R&D and R&D carried out in institutions of
higher education as a percentage of GDP, 2006 or closest
‘High academic
research spend
correlates with high
business R&D spend.’
5The idea that there is a
positive relationship
between the size of a
country and its propen-
sity to invest in R&D is
empirically and theoret-
ically supported by
Guellec (1999) and
Desmet and Parente
(2006).
6See Philippon and
Véron (2008), Bruegel
Policy Brief 2008/1
‘Financing Europe’s fast
movers’.
7See van Pottelsberghe
and François (2006).
8Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe (2004)
provide evidence sug-
gesting that the social
return to academic
research is higher than
the social return to
business R&D.
9Walsh (2007) docu-
ments evidence on
more than 750 foreign-
owned R&D centres in
China in 2005.
10Philippe Aghion,
André Sapir, Mathias
Dewatripont, Caroline
Hoxby and Andreu  Mas-
Colell, Bruegel Policy
Brief, 2007/4, ‘Why
Reform Europe's
Universities?’.
Source: OECD, MSTI, 2007.EUROPE’S R&D: MISSING THE WRONG TARGETS?
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